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1940] MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
THE MARYLAND OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE LAW
By J. NICHOLAS SHRIVER, JR.*
An authority on occupational diseases and occupational
disease legislation reports that probably King Rothari of
ancient Lombardy promulgated the first Workmen's Com-
pensation Act in the year 653 A. D.1 This "edict", how-
ever, was probably not passed with any too altruistic mo-
tives, because we are informed that one of the more imme-
diate results of this part of the Rotharian Code was the col-
lection, by the State, of fines ranging as high as 50% of the
benefits paid by the party responsible for the injury, for
the sole benefit of the Rotharian regal coffers. 2
It is not the purpose of this paper to outline the various
steps through which governments, haltingly following Ro-
thari's footsteps, finally came to recognize the truth which
students of sociology and of the moral law had long recog-
nized as self evident; i. e., that the laborer accepting the
burdens of industrial employment was entitled to serious
consideration from industry when he received injuries as a
result of his employment.3 This gradual recognition of the
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1933, LL.B., 1937, Georgetown
University.
1 Workmen'8 Compensation Legialation--Occupational Di8eases (1935).
Address to the Convention of the International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commissions, delivered by Thomas N. Bartlett, Esq.,
of the Baltimore City Bar.
2 Ibid.
3 That this had long been an accepted principle see the following: En-
cyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII on the condition of Labor (1891) "Rerum
Novarum"; Encyclical Letter of Pope Pius XI on Reconstructing the Social
Order (1931) "Quadragesimo Anno"; The Idea of Social Legislation, by
Charles W. Pipkin; The Worker and the State, by Frank Tillyard; Prin-
ciples of Labor Legislation, by Commons and Andrews; Labor and the
Government, by the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.; Social Politics and
Modern Democracies, by Charles W. Pipkin; A History of Factory Legisla-
tion, by B. L. Hutchins and A. H. Harrison; Social Insurance, compiled by
Julie E. Johnsen, particularly page 79 et seq.; Labor's Risks and Social
Insurance, by Harry A. Millis and Robert E. Montgomery; Workmen's
Compensation Insurance, by G. F. Michelbacker and Thomas M. Nial;
Administration of Workmen's Compensation, by Walter F. Dodd. A very
interesting treatise on the early legislation in the nineteenth century, and
the reasons for it, is a report, first published in 1884, entitled "Employers'
Liability for Personal Injuries to Their Employes", by Charles G. Fall of
the Suffolk Bar (Massachusetts). It was a part of the 14th Annual
Report of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor for 1883. and
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principle of workmen's compensation has been ably cov-
ered elsewhere.4 But it is of interest to note here that
apparently the first attempt in the United States (legisla-
tion bearing both specifically and generally upon work-
men's compensation had been enacted toward the end of
the third quarter of the nineteenth century in most of the
countries of Europe, and particularly on the continent of
Europe),' was a Federal law effective in 1908 covering cer-
tain employees engaged in government construction work.'
The first State to pass a workmen's compensation law was
New York, in 1910. 7 Maryland passed her first act in 1914,8
and it has uniformly been sustained by the Courts as a con-
stitutionally proper exercise of legislative power.9
Practically all of the early acts were confined to "acci-
dental injuries" or "personal injuries by accident" required
to have been sustained during "the course of the employ-
ment" and to have "arisen out of the employment". There
was no immediate legislative recognition of the occupa-
tional disease problem,10 partly at least because occupa-
tional diseases were not considered a problem in this coun-
try until the last fifteen years." Nor was it (nor is it
today) a simple matter to determine the line of demarca-
tion between occupational and non-occupational diseases.12
A more important reason, however, was that judicial inter-
contains interesting arguments that show some of the real needs for
Workmen's Compensation legislation. Accident Prevention and Relief, by
Schwedtman and Emery is interesting as a survey of European legislative
history and as containing recommendations for American legislation.
4 See supra, notes 1 and 3.
5 Ibid.
635 Stat. 556 (1908).
71 SCHNEIER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2d Ed.) Sec. 2.
8 Md. Laws 1914, Ch. 800; now Md. Code (1924) Art. 101.
9Held constitutional in various cases in Maryland. See particularly
Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 96 A. 764 (1916) ; Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly
Co., 131 Md. 265, 101 A. 710 (1917) ; Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md.
482, 144 A. 696 (1929).
10 See supra n. 1. Also, by the same author, What Is an Occupational
Disease (1938) an address delivered before the Insurance Section of the
American Bar Association, Baltimore Daily Record, August 22, 1938.
"I There are a number of available works that can be consulted by the
interested person. See Health Maintenance in Industry (1925) by J. 0.
Hackett; Administration of Workmen's Compensation (1936) by Walter F.
Dodd; Industrial Maladies (1934) by Thomas Legge; and Medicolegal
Phases of Occupational Diseases (1939) by C. 0. Sappington.
22 See generally in this connection, Ornstein and Ulmar, Tuberculosis and
Silicosi.s (October, 1936) Sea View Hospital Quarterly Bulletin.
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pretation of the breadth of the various state acts was lack-
ing, and conservative American legislatures waited for the
judicial branch of the government to point the way accu-
rately.
Most of the State Courts, of course, followed English
precedents, and in the majority of jurisdictions there was
set up a definite line of demarcation between accidental
injury and non-accidental injury. In Massachusetts the
statute did not use the word "accidental", but simply pro-
vided compensation in the event of "personal injury". The
Court then quickly decided that this phrase included all
"injuries", including occupational diseases. 18 In Maryland,
on the other hand, though the question was kept in the
lower courts for a long period of time, the Court of Appeals
definitely decided that occupational diseases were not com-
pensable under the clause "accidental injuries ... and
such disease and infection as may naturally result there-
from . ..".11 Other states, by various modes of judicial
interpretation, for the most part held that occupational
diseases were not covered by the original acts. A typical
example is Michigan, which held directly to the contrary
of the Hurle case in Massachusetts. 5 The air was thus
cleared of doubt to a great extent, at least in the respective
jurisdictions. Since the two cases referred to above, legis-
lation or judicial interpretation have brought occupational
diseases, either generally or specifically, under the com-
pensation laws of 23 States. 16
'8 In re Hurle, 217 Mass. 223, 104 N. . 336 (1914).
' Md. Laws 1914, Ch. 800, Sec. 62, now Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, Sec. 65.
See also, Ibid., Sec. 14. Presumably the reason it was 1925 before the
Court of Appeals even was called upon directly to define "accidental per-
sonal injury" was because the assumption was made at the very outset of
the administration of the Act that occupational diseases were excluded
in the Act itself. The first case, strangely enough, in which a definition
of "accidental personal injury" was given by the Court of Appeals was the
famous case of Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635
(1925), which has been cited far and wide as Maryland's attempt to legis-
late occupational disease coverage by judicial interpretation. This case
will be fully discussed later in the text of this paper.
" Adams v. Acme White Lead Co., 182 Mich. 157, 148 N. W. 485 (1914);
the statute here was identical with that in Massachusetts, and used the
phrase "personal injury". The judicial construction is based in part on
the preamble of the Act.
"Arkansas (approved by Governor, March 14, 1939); California (Sec.
3 (4)); Connecticut (Sec. 5223); Delaware (Sec. 44); Idaho (approved
1940]
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PART II
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MARYLAND
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT
At the 1935 session of the Maryland Legislature a bill
was presented to provide compensation benefits for all
occupational diseases. The bill failed in committee. This
was not the first attempt to pass such a bill, but always in
the past such efforts had resulted in complete failure.
However, the 1935 session of the Legislature did not pass
into history before one very real accomplishment in the
field of Occupational Disease legislation. By its Joint
Resolution No. 1611 it directed the Governor of Maryland
to appoint a commission for the purpose of preparing an
Occupational Disease legislative program for the State of
Maryland, if it should find one necessary.
Following the direction of this Joint Resolution, Gov-
ernor Nice in October of 1935 appointed the members of
the "Maryland Commission for the Study of Occupational
Diseases". This Commission was promptly organized, and
Theodore C. Waters, a Baltimore attorney, was elected
Chairman.18 The Resolution further provided that the At-
by Governor, March 7, 1939) ; Illinois (Sees. 5; 6; 8 (1) 3) ; Indiana (Secs.5(e) ; 6; 8 (n) ; 0. D. Law) ; Kentucky (See. 1) ; Maryland (See. 32 A-J;54; 56; 65 (6) effective June 1, 1939) ; Massachusetts (See. 26); Michigan(Part VII, Sees. 1 (c) ; 2) ; Minnesota (See. 4327 (1), (2)) ; Missouri (See.
3305 (6)); Nebraska (See. 48-152 (b)) ; New Jersey (See. II 22 (b));New York (See. 3 (2)) ; North Carolina (See. 50% (a) ; (b)) ; North
Dakota (See. 2); Ohio (See. 1465-68 a-as amended May 26, 1939);
Pennsylvania (See. 2 0. D. Act., as amended by 1939 Acts, Chapter 284 on
June 21, 1939) ; Rhode Island (Art. VIII, Secs. 1 (c) ; 2); Washington(See. 7679-1) ; West Virginia (Art. 6, sec. 5) ; Wisconsin (See. 102, 01 (2)).
In addition to the above, the Federal Longshoremen's Act (33 U. S. C. A.§ 900, Supp. 1936), and the District of Columbia Code (Tit. 19, Sees. 11-12),
particularly by Sec. 2 of the Federal Act, cover, as to all general Federaljurisdictions and as to the District of Columbia, all occupational diseases.
" Md. Laws 1935, Joint Resolution No. 16.
16 The members of the Commission were as follows: Dr. Page Edmunds,
representing the Maryland Medical and Chirurgical Faculty; Dr. Allen W.
Freeman, of the Johns Hopkins Hospital; Dr. Robert Riley of the State
Health Dept.; Mr. A. Stengle Marine of the State Labor Dept.; Mr. Joseph
B. McCurdy of the American Federation of Labor; Mr. Albert R. Couch-
man, representing the self-insured employers of the State of Maryland;
Hon. William F. Broening, representing the State Industrial Accident Com-
mission; Mr. Thomas N. Bartlett, an attorney and insurance company
executive, as a member at large. The Joint Resolution provided for two
members at large and Mr. Waters, the Chairman, was this other member.
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torney General of the State of Maryland should be the
counsel for the Commission and thus Governor Herbert R.
O'Conor, then Attorney General, became its legal advisor.
The Commission immediately began its work, and pub-
lic hearings were held. The Surgeon General of the United
States was requested to direct a survey of Maryland in-
dustry aimed at a determination of the Occupational Dis-
ease hazards and exposures in this State.19 At the public
hearings, which were widely advertised, many of the lead-
ing medical authorities in the United States appeared and
testified.20  Interested employees, employers and insurance
companies also were heard. In addition to these public
hearings and to the report of the Surgeon General of the
United States, the Commission made a complete survey of
the laws in states which had already enacted Occupational
Disease statutes.
In November, 1936, the Commission forwarded to Gov-
ernor Nice its recommendations, embodied in the form of
specific proposed legislation. The legislation drafted by
the Commission and its counsel was approved by every
member, and was presented to the Legislature at the 1937
19 In a paper of this nature it is impossible to give all of the space desired
to cover points indirectly affecting the subject matter yet In themselves
tremendously important. For example, of paramount and lasting import-
ance to Maryland industry, and particularly to those Maryland Industries
subject to occupational disease exposures, is the study made by the United
States Public Health Service at the request of the Waters Commission,
and cooperated in to the fullest degree by the State Department of Health,
the Baltimore City Health Department, the Bureau of Environmental
Hygiene, the Baltimore Bureau of Occupational Diseases, and the State
Bureau of Sanitary Enginering. This survey, and the data and material
collected, probe deeply into the occupational disease exposures to which
Maryland employees are subjected, in great detail. Recently the United
States Public Health Service has published a brochure entitled "Evaluation
of the Industrial Hygiene Problems of a State", which in summary form
tabulates, analyzes and explains at length (a) the method used in the
Maryland survey and (b) the general results of the survey. It makes in-
teresting reading, but Its chief value lies In the analysis it makes of the
exposures in Maryland Industry. Needless to say the Survey formed a
fundamental basis for the specific disease recommendations of the Waters
Commission. (The brochure referred to is published by the Government
Printing Office.) The fact that such a survey was conducted gives some
indication of the thoroughness with which that Commission conducted its
preliminary work.
2" A complete transcript of all the statements made at these public hear-
ings was transmitted to the Governor on both occasions when the Com-
mission forwarded its recommendations. For a list of those who spoke
at these hearings, see the Report of the Commission to Governor O'Conor
submitted January 23, 1939.
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session, but failed of enactment. It passed the Senate suc-
cessfully, but was never reported out of committee to the
House of Delegates.
Following this unsuccessful attempt, the Commission
was requested by Governor Nice to continue its work and
to forward any additional recommendations it might have
to the 1939 legislature. The Commission again took up its
labors, held additional public hearings, and on January
23rd, 1939, forwarded to Governor O'Conor its revised rec-
ommendations, again in the form of a draft of a bill. In
the meantime, one of Governor O'Conor's campaign pledges
in the 1938 election contest had been that he would sponsor
the passage of Occupational Disease legislation.
The bill was introduced in the House by Mr. Tolle,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee,2 1 and referred to
that Committee. Public hearings were held, and the bill
was unanimously reported to the House by this Commit-
tee, it having in the meanwhile become sponsored by both
Messrs. Tolle and Novak, the latter of whom had previously
introduced at the 1939 session an "all inclusive bill", pro-
posing to cover all Occupational Diseases without descrip-
tion of specific diseases.22
The bill sponsored by the Commission unanimously
passed the House and was sent to the Senate Judiciary
Committee. After an informal hearing with the Chairman
of the Maryland Commission for the study of Occupational
Diseases, the Judiciary Committee reported the bill unani-
mously to the floor of the Senate. A last minute attempt
(the first opposition which had arisen to the bill) to amend
it by lessening to a large degree the power invested in the
Medical Board, was sponsored by a Senator from Western
Maryland. However, before the opposition crystalized,
this Senator withdrew his proposed amendment. The bill
thereupon was enacted unanimously by the Senate, and
sent to Governor O'Conor. Public hearings were held by
the Governor, and at these hearings several labor leaders
21 H. B. No. 484.
22 H. B. No. 83.
[VOL. IV
1940] OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
expressed dissatisfaction with the bill. However, this op-
position apparently did not by any means represent a
majority of organized labor or of labor organizations, and
on May 24, 1939, Governor O'Conor signed the Occupa-
tional Disease amendment to the Maryland Workmen's
Compensation Act.23 The Act went into effect on June
1st, 1939.24
PART III
THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT OF 1939-ITS PROVISIONS,
AND COMMENTS THEREON
Although the Occupational Disease Amendment 5 to the
Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act 26 will, when codi-
fied, simply become an integral part of the Compensation
Act,27 yet reference to the amendment will, for the sake of
simplicity, be made in this paper as "the Occupational
Disease Act", or, simply, as "the Act".
The Act proposes to reclassify the work of employees
by providing that employees injuriously subjected to cer-
tain listed exposures will be deemed to be engaged in
extra hazardous employment, and that employees contract-
ing any of the listed diseases as a result of their employ-
ment shall be paid compensation for disability or death.28
There are various limiting provisions in connection with
this new schedule of compensable "injuries", and there are
lMd. Laws 1939, Ch. 465.
"The author is indebted to Theodore C. Waters, Esq., Chairman of the
Maryland Commission for the Study of Occupational Diseases, for the
data from which the above history of the events leading up to the enact-
ment of the Maryland Occupational Disease Act was obtained.
"5 Md. Laws 1939, Ch. 465, Sec. 1, adding ten sections, to be known as
Sections 32A to 32J, inclusive, to Md. Code (1924) and Md. Code Supp.
(1935), Art. 101, and amending Secs. 54, 56 and 65. Subsequent references
in this paper will be to "Act," followed by the proposed added or amended
Code section numbers.
"'Md. Code (1924) Art. 101.
"'Act, Sec. 1, preamble.
" Act, See. 32-A: "Every employee who, in the regular course of his
employment, is injuriously subjected to an exposure to any of the occupa-
tional diseases hereinafter named, In an occupation or process hereinafter
set down opposite the name of such disease, shall be deemed to be engaged
in an extra-hazardous employment within the provisions of Section 32 of
this Article. Compensation as provided In this Article shall be payable
for disability or death of an employee resulting from the following occupa-
tional diseases . . .".
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also various procedural and other necessary explanatory
sections of this new Act. For the sake of clarity, there-
fore, the author has divided the Act into ten parts, and will
in the following pages outline the Act under these various
heads, and comment generally upon their probable legal
effect.
1. Respective Limitations and Duties Placed Upon
Employe and Employer
As is customary in all types of legislation such as Work-
men's Compensation Acts, the persons affected are charged
with certain limitations and duties. This is only proper,
because the Acts are passed usually in complete derogation
of the common law, and therefore there must be limitations
upon the enforcement of such laws.29 Thus it is that the
Occupational Disease Act requires that when an employe
enters into an employment contract with his employer, he
shall correctly state his previous medical history with ref-
erence to occupational diseases where such information is
required by his employer. For failure to be accurate in
this regard, in writing, and specifically with regard to
"having previously been disabled, laid off, or compensated
in damages or otherwise" by reason of any compensable
occupational disease, 0 the penalty is forfeiture of the right
to compensation for the particular disease s' about which
the misrepresentation is made.82
The employe or someone acting for him is required to
give to the employer written notice of an occupational dis-
ease within ten days of "the first distinct manifestation
thereof".,3 In case of death this notice, also written, must
"9 See generally in this connection Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md.
265, 101 A. 710 (1917) ; Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 248, 153
A. 283 (1931).
80 Act, See. 32-B. The Act is not entirely clear here, but in using the
words "No compensation shall be payable for an occupational disease (if
there is a false representation of previous disablement, discharge or com-
pensation) because of such disease" (italics supplied), the section probably
limits the effect of a penalty for such misrepresentation to a false repre-
sentation of a previous occupational disease actually scheduled In Section
32-A.
"i Ibid.
82 Act, Section 32-B. second paragraph.
82 Act, Sec. 32-F.
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be given the employer within thirty days of the death.84
These provisions, however, are definitely limited, in that
the actual knowledge of the employer is deemed to be
sufficient notice, and further in that the employer must
specifically raise the issue of notice at the hearing or else
it is "deemed waived".85
There must be a claim filed by the employe or his de-
pendents within one year of the date. of disablement or
death; however, although the statute states that failure
to file such a claim shall "forever" bar it, a typical statutory
proviso follows negativing what has gone before. Failure
to object on the part of the employer at the time of the
hearing shall constitute a waiver of the bar; further, if pay-
ments of compensation are made there is an absolute
waiver; and finally and most importantly (and this makes
the "forever" seem slightly overemphasized), if "the em-
ployer or his insurance carrier by his or its conduct leads
the employe or claimant reasonably to believe that notice
or claim has been waived by his or its affirmative conduct",
then "notice or claim shall be deemed waived".,6
The employe shall not be entitled to compensation
where his last injurious exposure occurred before June 1,
1939.8T
There are special provisions in the Act affecting silicosis
and asbestosis, and they will be considered later,88 but one
of these it is proper to include here. That is the provision
that, with the approval of the Medical Board created by
,Ibid.
"Ibid.
"Ibid. This language seems to the writer to be much more favorable
to the employe, and to the successful breach of the time limitation, than
that of the Workmen's Compensation Act regarding a claim covering an
accidental injury. There circumstances amounting to fraud or estoppel
must be shown, and there the period of limitation begins to run again
with the discovery of the fraud or the cessation of the facts amounting to
an estoppel. Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, Sec. 39. See Vang Construction Co.
v. Marcoccia, 154 Md. 401, 140 A. 712 (1928). Reasonable belief of affirma-
tive conduct seems much more of a question of dispute in fact, and hence
more susceptible of proof, than estoppel. Perhaps this language of Section
32-F is an attempt to define "estoppel" or "fraud" as used in Section 39.
See also the very recent decision of the Court of Appeals in Parks and
Hull, et al., v. Reimsnyder, 9 A. (2d) 648 (Md. 1939).
11 Act, Sec. 32-F.
Be See topic number 7, infra notes 70-91.
1940]
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the Act, 9 employes actually suffering with silicosis or
asbestosis are permitted to waive total compensation for
any future aggravation of their condition. Should an em-
ploye thereafter suffer aggravation, his compensation
under the Act shall be limited by his waiver to a maximum
of $2,000.00. Such waiver shall carry over to any new
employer in the same trade, and the Commission is author-
ized to prepare forms for such waiver, and to govern the
handling of such forms.40
Finally, under this category, the employer is required
to report any disability to an employe arising from an occu-
pational disease, "promptly upon obtaining knowledge or
notice thereof", to the Commission."1
2. Limitations on Dependency.
There is a limitation applicable to claims of dependents
under the Occupational Disease Act to the same effect as
that already present in the Workmen's Compensation Act.42
In case death results from an occupational disease it is
provided that no dependency relationship within the mean-
ing of the Act may be created by marriage or otherwise
after the beginning of the first compensable disability from
an occupational disease. Dependent after-born children of
a marriage pre-existing the compensable disability are, of
course, excluded from this limitation.4a
In addition to the above limitation, it is provided that
death (or disablement) must result within one year after
the last injurious exposure to an occupational disease (3
years if silicosis or asbestosis), or in the alternative that
death follow continuous disability (beginning within the
above periods) for which a claim has been filed and com-
pensation awarded or paid within seven years of the last
80 See topic number 8, infra notes 92-93.
"0 Act, See. 32-E.
"1 Act, Sec. 32-F. This reporting requirement is Identical with that In the
Workmen's Compensation Act, Md. Code (1924) Art. 101. See. 38.
'" Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, Sec. 43.
"Act, See. 32-C. Cf. Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, Secs. 36, 43, which
allow compensation to a dependent widow, even though marriage Is con-
tracted after injury, if there are dependent children of such marriage.
142 [VOL. IV
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injurious exposure.44  This apparently is, in effect, a stat-
ute of limitations placed on dependents' rights, as well as
on the rights of claimants themselves.
3. Which Employer Is Liable?
The Act provides for the difficulty of determining the
employer actually responsible for the disability by a seem-
ingly practical solution. That is that "the employer in
whose employment the employe was last injuriously ex-
posed to the hazards of such disease . . . shall be liable
therefor". So also the average weekly wage shall be com-
puted on the same basis and all notices and claims shall be
given to and filed against such employer. In the case of
the dust diseases, silicosis and asbestosis, "the only em-
ployer . . . liable shall be the last employer in whose em-
ployment the employe was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of the disease during a period of sixty (60) days
or more" after June 1, 1939. This seems to be a fair provi-
sion, and very practical, though undoubtedly some injustice
must be done in its application. 5
4. Apportionment of Disability.
In connection with occupational diseases there are fre-
quently aggravations of such diseases by other diseases not
scheduled in the Act, or even more frequently there may
:4 Act, Sec. 32-C.
"1Ibid. Compare this with the language of New York Code, Ch. 66.
Art. 3, Sec. 44: "The total compensation due shall be recoverable from
the employer who last employed the employee in the employment to the
nature of which the disease was due and in which it was contracted. If,
however, such disease was contracted while such employee was in the
employment of a prior employer, the employer who Is made liable for the
total compensation as provided by this section, may appeal to the board
for an apportionment of such compensation among the several employers
who since the contraction of such disease shall have employed such em-
ployee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due.
Such apportionment shall be proportioned to the time such employee was
employed in the service of such employers, and shall be determined only
after a hearing, notice of the time and place of which shall have been
given to every employer alleged to be liable for any portion of such com-
pensation. If the Board find that any portion of such compensation is
payable by an employer prior to the employer who is made liable to the
total compensation as provided by this section, it shall make an award
accordingly in favor of the last employer, and such award may be en-
forced in the same manner as an award for compensation."
1940]
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be pre-existing uncompensable illnesses aggravated or con-
tributed to by occupational diseases. The Act recognizes
this fact, and provides that compensation shall be appor-
tioned accordingly." An interesting departure in this con-
nection is that disability or death may be apportioned be-
tween the compensable occupational disease and the non-
compensable disease, either aggravated by or aggravating
the occupational disease. The causes of death have been
held not apportionable by the Maryland Court of Appeals
when death results from a combination of accidental injury
and pre-existing or contributing non-compensable diseases,
under the accidental injury portion of the Compensation
Act.47
5. Occupational Diseases Scheduled in the Act.
The Act lists thirty-four diseases under the heading
"Description of Diseases"." This schedule of diseases in-
cludes a large number of all that apparently could arise
from the nature of Maryland industry, and follows, with
few exceptions, the results of the survey conducted by the
agencies mentioned in Part II of this paper, which was
directed by the United States Public Health Service.49 In
connection with that survey, it may be of interest to the
reader to know the hypothetical conclusions reached there-
in, with particular reference to the various exposures in
" The exact language of this part of Sec. 32-B, par. 3, follows: "Where
an occupational disease is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity,
not itself compensable, or where disability or death from any other cause,
not Itself compensable, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated or in any wise
contributed to by an occupational disease, (then compensation will only
be allowed on a proportionate basis)."
' Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, Sec. 36 (4). See the only decision on this
point in Maryland, Ross v. Smith, 169 Md. 86, 93, 179 A. 173 (1935) : "...
where death ensues, there is no basis for the determination of the propor-
tionate disability attributable to an old hernia and to the later strangulated
hernia as is required by the statute in case of a disability that is due in
part to an accidental injury and, in part, to a preexisting disease or infirm-
ity . . . The disability of a servant is conditioned on his being alive". In
other words, in line with the wording of many of the compensation acts,
the Court of Appeals recognized the distinction made between the words
"disability" and "death", and refused to agree with the appellant, who
logically enough (grammatically, at least) maintained that death was the
ultimate in disability, and hence that when the Compensation Act men-
tioned disability, death was automatically included.
" Act, Sec. 32-A.
,o See supra n. 19.
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Maryland industry. It may be stated here that the survey
was, of course, necessarily a sampling procedure, and the
figures listed in the footnote are projected percentages ap-
plied to all of Maryland industry from the sample taken.
It should further be stated that the survey included a cross-
section of all of Maryland industry. There was a direct
and complete study made of 136,422 employees, this being
considered a representative sample. There were, as of
the 1930 census, 672,906 "gainful workers" in Maryland.
Of these, 234,207 individuals were engaged, generally
speaking, in non-hazardous employment. So that there
were, again speaking generally, 438,699 employees in Mary-
land hazardous industries as of 1930. With this explana-
tion the table set forth in the footnote below will show
some of the important conclusions of the survey. These
conclusions are particularly interesting when compared
with the list of scheduled diseases in the Occupational
Disease Act.50 For example the carbon monoxide exposure
U. S. Health Department Survey-Table 2S:
Number
of Persons
Materials Exposed
Gases:
Carbon monoxide ................... 40,795
Sulphur dioxide ..................... 12,711
Other gases ......................... 6,799
Hydrogen sulphide .................. 887
Metallic mineral dusts:
Other metallic mineral dusts ......... 29,857
Lead and its compounds .............. 15,668
Mercury and its compounds ........... 887
Arsenic and its compounds ........... 296
Nonmetallic mineral dusts:
Other nonmetallic mineral dusts ...... 19,806
Silica dust .......................... 7,686
Coal dust, bituminous ................ 6,799
Other silicate dusts .................. 3,547
Coal dust, anthracite ................ 177
Asbestos dust ....................... 59
Organic dusts ........................... 31,631
Oils .................................... 27,788
Other dermatitis producers .............. 23,354
Organic solvents ........................ 17,737
Chemicals .............................. 8,868
Coal-tar products ........................ 7,686
Acids ................................... 7,390
Alkalies ................................ 6,208
Of the exposures listed above, only six are apparently not il
any specific manner covered in the Maryland Act. They are:
sulphur dioxide, bituminous coal dust, other silicate dust,
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is the largest in Maryland, while the asbestosis exposure is
the most minute. Yet both are compensable under the
Act." '
A large number of diseases are covered, to which there
is apparently little or no industrial exposure in Maryland.
This fact can at least be partially explained by pointing out
that the schedule is, almost verbatim, that of the New York
Act.5 2
6. Qualifications on Compensability of Diseases
Scheduled in the Act.
(a) The disease must arise out of
a specified "process or occupation".
In a column parallel to and in juxtaposition with the
column describing the specific compensable diseases there
is a list entitled "Description of Process or Occupation".53
This language differs from that used in the New York
Act,54 in which the phrase "Description of Process" is used.
However, in view of the decisions in New York State, it is
thought that the variation will have the effect of neither
broadening nor restricting the inclusiveness of the listed
anthracite coal dust, organic dusts, and alkalies. Of these,
dangerous exposures to at least two (sulphur dioxide and alka-
lies) probably would produce such immediate results that the
Court would hold that there had been an "accidental injury".
The others the Commission apparently had good reasons, med-
ical, economic and/or practical, for not including. Of course
in stating that all the other exposures are probably included
in the present schedule the writer has grouped some of the
"other" classifications in the category of included diseases.
This is not completely correct, for example, in the cases of
"other metallic mineral dusts" or "other non-metallic mineral
dusts". However, these categories are at least partially in-
cluded in the Act, and hence have been included in the writer's
analysis.
', Act, Sec. 32-A, (27) (34). It may be of interest to point out here the
fact that out of a total of three (so far as the author can determine)
carbon monoxide cases to reach the Maryland Court of Appeals, all have
been won by the claimant on the theory of accidental injury! Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. Traylor, 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246, 73 A. L. R. 479 (1930) ; Mt.
Savage Mining Co. v. Baker, 159 Md. 380, 150 A. 864 (1930) ; Red Star
Coaches v. Chatham, 163 Md. 412, 163 A. 886 (1933). In the last named of
these three cases the accidental nature of the injury was not even ques-
tioned on the appeal by the employer, and it reached the Court of Appeals
on another ground.
32 Cahill's Consolidated Laws of New York (1930), Ch. 66, Sec. 3(2).
58 Act, Sec. 32-A.
51 Supra n. 52.
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processes. In the New York case of Nielsen v. Firemen's
Fund Indemnity Co.,54a the Court unanimously stated:
"While it is true that the terms of the statute are
broad enough to embrace continuous friction and rub-
bing caused by a shoe in walking,55 this is not the in-
tent of the law. 'Process', as employed in the statute,
denotes broadly the use and handling of implements
and materials in industry, by the laborer in the per-
formance of his task and by the artisan in the exercise
of his skill in fabrication and craftsmanship. ''
It is submitted that that language would be fully appli-
cable to the Maryland Act, with the added thought that, if
anything, the use of the words "or occupation", in addition
to the word "process", would even more clearly delimit the
intention of the legislature."7
(b) The disease must not only be scheduled
in the Act, but must "be due to the
nature of an employment".
Nowhere in the Act is there a definition of the term
"occupational disease". Yet it is the belief of the author
that the difficulties and serious problems that have arisen
in other jurisdictions in which there is no definition of
occupational disease will not arise in Maryland, at least to
the extent they have in some of the other jurisdictions, even
when occupational diseases were not covered by statutes.58
There are two reasons for this belief. The first is that the
54a 239 App. Div. 239, 268 N. Y. S. 189 (1933).
"' Compare this with the description of the processes opposite Items 30
and 31 of the Maryland Act, See. 32-A.
" 239 App. Div. 239, 240, 268 N. Y. S. 189, 191 (1933).
37 See also Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N. Y. 313, 12 N. E. (2d) 311,
313 (1938) : ". . . compensation is restricted to disease resulting from the
ordinary and generally recognized risks incident to a particular employ-
ment, and usually from working therein over a somewhat extended period".
This point will be clarified still more, it is believed, by a further considera-
tion of other provisions in the Maryland Act.
" Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N. Y. 313, 12 N. E. (2d) 311 (1938);
McNeely v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N. C. 568, 174 S. E. 509 (1934);
Swink v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 210 N. C. 303, 186 S. E. 258 (1936) (injury
before occupational disease act passed) ; Evans v. Chevrolet Co., 232 Mo.
App. 937, 105 S. W. (2d) 1081 (1937) ; Madeo v. I. Dibner & Bro., 121 Conn.
664, 186 A. 616 (1936) ; In Illinois by specific statutory enactment the term
is defined, but there Is no schedule of diseases; so also In Connecticut.
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Court of Appeals has consistently since 192559 defined occu-
pational disease uniformly,60 and thus one great source of
argument is rather definitely and completely decided. In
the Victory Sparkler case the Court defined an occupational
disease as follows:
"... one which arises from causes incident to the
profession or labor of the party's occupation or calling.
It has its origin in the inherent nature or mode of work
of the profession or industry, and it is the usual result
or concomitant. If, therefore, [and here the Court
goes on to make its meaning clear beyond dispute] a
disease is not a customary or natural result of the pro-
fession or industry, per se, but is the consequence of
some extrinsic condition or independent agency, the
disease or injury cannot be imputed to the occupation
or industry, and is in no accurate sense an occupation
or industry disease."'1
The second reason the Maryland Courts should have
little difficulty in disposing of this queston is because of the
very explicit language in the Act itself. This or similar
language is not found in the New York Act, nor is it found
so definitely in any of the original State Acts.2 Some of
the Courts have arrived at similar conclusions, after ex-
tended litigation brought out the points involved. 3 In no
less than 3 separate places the Maryland Act states and re-
peats the fundamental requirements for compensability of
an occupational disease.6 4  In the first instance (Section
32-A) it uses the words "injuriously subjected to an ex-
" Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635, 44 A. L. R.
363 (1925).
-0 Gunter v. Sharpe & Dohme, 159 Md. 438, 151 A. 134 (1930)-; Sinsko v.
A. Weiskettel & Sons, 163 Md. 614, 163 A. 851 (1933) ; Foble v. Knefely, 6
A. (2d) 48 (Md. 1939).
"1 Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 379, 128 A. 635, 638, 44 A.
L. R. 363, 368 (1925). In the latest case in Maryland, Foble v. Knefely, 6 A.
(2d) 48. 53 (Md. 1939), the Court reiterates its stand: "(An occupational
disease is) some ailment, disorder or illness which is the expectable result
of working under conditions naturally Inherent In the employment and
inseparable therefrom, and is ordinarily slow and insidious In its ap-
proach".
6" See various state acts referred to supra n. 16; also various charts of
U. S. Labor Department, Division of Labor Standards, referred to infra.
6" See Bartlett, supra notes 1 and 10.
",Act, Section 32-A, first paragraph: Section 32-B, first paragraph; Sec-
tion 32-C, third paragraph.
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posure", thus at the outset qualifying the fact of exposure.
The exposure must be "injurious". Next (Section 32-B)
it is found that the employee must be "disabled from per-
forming his work in the last occupation in which he was in-
juriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, or dies as
a result of such disease, and the disease was due to the
nature of an occupation or process described in Section
32-A hereof . . ." (Italics supplied). Finally, the Act
(Section 32-C) links all that has been said before in-an ap-
parently indisputable sine qua non, as follows:
"An employer shall not be liable for any compensa-
tion for an occupational disease unless such disease
shall be due to the nature of an employment in which
the hazards of such disease actually exist, are char-
acteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation,
process, or employment, and is actually incurred in his
employment . . .-. 65
It seems to be a logical deduction from the above lan-
guage that the Occupational Disease Commission, and the
legislature, had clearly in mind the experience in other
jurisdictions. Possibly they had before them the New
York decisions, and the difficulties experienced in finally
limiting the broad coverage extended by the 1935 amend-
ment to the New York Law.66 Undoubtedly, too, they re-
'5 Note the striking resemblance between the statutory language quoted
and the definition in Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks. 147 Md. 368, 128 A.
635, 44 A. L. R. 363 (1925).
06 Prior to 1935 New York had an Act scheduling twenty-seven specific
occupational diseases and processes. In 1935 there was added, under the
"Disease" column, the words: "Any and all occupational diseases". Under
the "Process" column were added: "Any and all employments enumerated(in the list of extra-hazardous employments)". The New York Court of
Appeals stated, in interpreting this addition, that in spite of the broad
coverage "(an occupational disease) is not the equivalent of a disease
resulting from the general risks and hazards common to every individual
regardless of the employment in which he is engaged". Also: "An occu-
pational disease is one which results from the nature of the employ-
ment . . . ; (in other words, from) conditions to which all employees of a
class are subject, and which produces the disease as a natural Incident of
a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which dis-
tinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the
hazard attending employment In general". Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp.,
276 N. Y. 313, 12 N. E. (2d) 311 (1938). Or, as a lower New York Court
stated the proposition: "With respect to occupational diseases, the statute
covers only those caused by special enumerated hazards to which the
1940]
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called the Idaho case of Ramsay v. Sullivan Mining Co.,67
which cited Judge Parke's language in the Victory Sparkler
case. That case cited with complete approval the definition
quoted previously in the text, infra, from the Victory case.68
All of the decisions, all of the facts and all of the experi-
ence of experts in the field indicated that there should be as
little doubt as possible left as to the intent of the Act. Ap-
parently this was understood by those responsible for the
Maryland Act, and acted upon accordingly. 9
7. Special Provisions as to Silicosis and Asbestosis.
Silicosis is defined in the Act to be ". . . the character-
istic fibrotic condition of the lungs caused by the inhalation
of silicon dioxide (SiO2 ) dust . . .".70 Asbestosis is simi-
larly defined: "the characteristic fibrotic condition of the
lungs caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust".7 '
Lung diseases present some of the most difficult of med-
ical diagnostic problems.72  Since Occupational Diseases
employe is peculiarly subjected; it does not provide compensation for dis-
ease resulting from the general hazards and risks common to every indi-
vidual, regardless of the nature of his employment". Nielsen v. Firemen's
Fund Indemnity Co., 239 App. Div. 239, 240, 268 N. Y. Supp. 189, 191 (1933).
11 61 Idaho 366, 6 Pac. (2d) 856 (1931).
68 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2 Ed.) 643, Sec. 223.
69 In this connection the reader is again referred to the address entitled
What Is an Occupational Disea8e, supra n. 10, by Thomas N. Bartlett, Esq.
Since Mr. Bartlett was a member of the Maryland Commission, his address
is particularly pertinent. In addition, it Is of interest to note that Theo-
dore C. Waters, Esq., the Chairman of the Maryland Commission, has been
since its Inception a member of the Committee on the Economic, Legal and
Insurance Phases of the Silicosis Problem of the National Solicosis Confer-
ence.
70 Act, See. 65(14).71 Ibid.
7' The literature on this subject and kindred ones is tremendous. The
major aspect of the pneumonoconioses is of course the medical one, and in
that regard the reader interested in a more thorough research is referred
to the exhaustive bibliography compiled by Miss Marian Clare of the
United States Public Health Service and included as Appendix C of the
pamphlet "Evaluation of the Industrial Hygiene Problems of a State",
Public Health Bulletin No. 236 of the U. S. Public Health Service. The
attorney-practitioner is also referred to this bibliography, as well as spe-
cifically to Tuberculosis and Silicosis, by Ornstein and Ulmar (Quarterly
Bulletin of Sea View Hospital, October 1936) ; Silicosis and Silicotubercu-
losis, by Ornstein (Medical Clinic of North America, September 1938);
Attorney's Text Book of Medicine, by Dr. Roscoe N. Gray (1934) ; Medico-
legal Phases of Occupational Disease, by Dr. C. 0. Sappington, (1939).
The current monthly periodical, Industrial Medicine, contains frequent and
worthwhile articles on this subject of general Interest to the practicing
attorney.
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have been publicized in recent years with the natural em-
phasis on silicosis-many incorrect diagnoses of silicosis or
pneumonoconiosis have been made. This has been due in
part at least to the tendency of the medical profession to lay
much stress upon occupational history in these cases. It is
a well known medical fact that most people in adult life
show some pathology of the lungs. Given some pulmon-
ary pathology and a history of occupational exposure to
silica many doctors have been prone to give the diagnosis
of "silicosis" or "pneumonoconiosis" without too much
study as to the nature of the pathology present and its
cause. In Maryland the industrial survey referred to fre-
quently above" indicated that the problem involved was
not of as great consequence numerically as it is in some other
states. It was estimated that only about 8,000 persons in
Maryland are exposed to silica dust (SiO2 ), while less than
100 apparently are exposed to asbestos dust. Yet both of
these diseases, which comprise a distinct division of the
generic term pneumonoconiosis,'4 are covered by the Act.75
Other dust diseases arising out of other non-metallic min-
eral dusts, are covered to the extent that they are some-
times sequelae of some of the diseases and processes sched-
uled. But silicosis and asbestosis, being so controversial,
are accorded separate treatment.76
The provisions covering both silicosis and asbestosis
recognize the fact that the exposure to silicosis is not great
in Maryland.77 They also recognize the fact that silicosis
is caused solely by the inhalation of silicon dioxide dust
into the alveoli at the extreme ends of the bronchioles of
the lungs.7 8 Finally, it recognizes the accepted medical
premise that, ordinarily, large quantities of particles of sili-
con dioxide (SiO2 ) of respirable size are necessary over a
long period of time for the development of silicosis, and
73 See particularly supra n. 19.
7' Gould's Medical Dictionary (4th Ed.)75 Act, Sec. 32-A, (33), (34).
" This is in line with the New York Act as it was finally amended in
1936.
7 See supra notes 19 and 73.
" Gray, op. cit. supra n. 72; Sappington, Ibi.
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that frequently a mistaken diagnosis is made in tubercular
cases, and even in cases of "heart disease, bronchitis or
asthma. ''7
The Act provides that for partial disability due to sili-
cosis or asbestosis no compensation shall be paid. 0 While
this fact may still be considered arguable by some, yet it
can fairly be stated that the weight of authority is that
partial disability from silicosis or asbestosis is non-existent.
Either a person with these diseases is totally disabled or
not disabled from doing ordinarily laborious work. Total
disability or death is necessary before compensation is
payable, in which event the maximum compensation pay-
able shall be governed by the existing compensation law.8'
There is a sliding scale of maximum benefits (beginning
at $500.00 and increasing at the rate of $50.00 per month)
payable in the event the disability or death occurs immedi-
ately following the effective date of the Act."2 There is an
additional limitation on the total amount payable, however,
71 Gray, op. cit. supra n. 72. See also U. S. Public Health Service Bulletin
No. 176 (1928).
80 Act, Sec. 32-D.
81 Ibid. The statute governing this provision is Md. Code (1924), Art.
101, Sec. 36. There is an important difference here, however, between the
Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act. Under the former
a claimant can receive benefits for total or partial disability while alive,
and his dependents may be paid a maximum of $5,000.00 compensation in
addition to the payments made the claimant (subject to a limitation that
the dependents may only be paid weekly payments at the regular rate (de-
pending upon the average wage of the employe) for the remainder of the
period between the date of the death and the 416 weeks following the
Injury). The employe has one right; the dependents an entirely separate
one. Sea Gull Specialty Co. v. Snyder, 151 Md. 78, 134 A. 133 (1926). This
is apparently not true in the Occupational Disease Act, because it is stated
that the "total compensation and death benefits payable (if disability or
death occurs during the month of June, 1939) shall not exceed the sum of
five hundred dollars ($500)". A $50.00 per month maximum increase is
then legislated, but again "for total disability and death". Finally, "such
progressive increase . .. shall continue only until such total amount equals
but does not .exceed the sums which would be payable to the particular
employe or his dependents; had such total permanent disability and death
been due to an accidental injury". (Italics supplied.) Act, Sec. 32-D. In
other words, under Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, See. 36, the employe totally
disabled from uncomplicated silicosis or asbestosis may be paid $6,000.00.
His dependents, if he dies, without receiving compensation himself, are
apparently entitled to receive a maximum of $5,000.00 in compensation
payments (subject of course to the average life expectancy of the de-
ceased). In no event, however, shall the total paid to both the employee
and his dependents exceed $6,000. This is not so in the case of an employe
injured by an accident. He and his dependents together may receive a
maximum far In excess of $6,000, under the circumstances explained above.
"Act, Sec. 32-D.
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which is important. That is that the average life expect-
ancy of a person of the age and sex of the deceased shall
govern the maximum of weekly payments to be made to
dependents in case death results from uncomplicated sili-
cosis or asbestosiss8
It is provided that, in the absence of conclusive evidence
in favor of the claim, there shall be a presumption "in
fact," so that unless an employee (or his dependent) can
show that, during a period of ten years before his disable-
ment, he was "exposed to the inhalation of silica dust or
asbestos dust" over a five-year span, two or which years
must have been in Maryland under a Maryland contract of
employment, then his death or disablement is not due to
the nature of his occupation. There is a proviso that if the
employee is in the employ of the same employer for the
five-year period, then it matters not that he has worked
outside of Maryland. 4
Obviously, even if these facts are met, the burden is still
on the employee (or his dependents) to prove as a matter
of fact that his exposure has been such as to be in fact
injurious, and further, that it caused his disability.
The limitation on dependents and/or claimants with
reference to the necessity that disablement or death from
silicosis or asbestosis occur within three years of the last
injurious exposure, unless the employee dies after a con-
3 Ibid.
81 Ibid. Section 32-D seems to ignore the limitation in Section 32-A rela-
tive to the contraction of occupational diseases. This apparently is an
oversight, and probably can be judicially resolved as one. The section
states: "In the absence of conclusive evidence in favor of the claim, dis-
ability or death from silicosis or asbestosis shall be presumed in fact not
to be due to the nature of any occupation within the provisions of Section
32-A of this Article . . . ". (Italics supplied.) Section 32-A purports ex-
pressly only to cover, respectively and severally, diseases contracted in the
processes or occupation listed opposite each disease. Therefore the only
occupations or processes covering silicosis and asbestosis are, respectively,
numbers 33 and 34 of Section 32-A. The other occupations listed in Section
32-A have no bearing, either by way of extension of limitation, upon the
compensability of silicosis. If they did, then the last paragraph of Section
32-C, and indeed the schedule itself, would be meaningless. It is certainly
highly probable that Section 32-D will be construed to apply to silicosis
(or asbestosis) arising out of any process or occupation "Involving an ex-
posure to or direct contact with silicon dioxide (S102) dust" or (asbestos
dust), and silicosis (asbestosis) from any other cause will be held non-
compensable.
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tinuous period of disability (which began within the three-
year period) for which a claim was filed within seven years
of the last injurious exposure, has been previously dis-
cussed."' This limitation is of course subject to the provi-
sion discussed in the last paragraph requiring conclusive
evidence of long exposure to either silica or asbestos dust.86
The provision in Section 32-D deals with the evidence re-
quired to prove an "injurious exposure" under the Act,
while Section 32-C limits the period during which disable-
ment or death must occur after the last "injurious expos-
ure '.
The waiver provision allowing the employee, even
though a victim of silicosis or asbestosis, to waive full
compensation in return for employment, is discussed under
Item 1, supra8 7
There is one other provision affecting and limiting the
right to compensation for silicosis and asbestosis. That is
that the only employer liable in these cases is the last
employer in whose employ the employe was last injuri-
ously exposed to the hazards of the disease during the sixty
days (or longer period) after June 1, 1939.88
A question may arise as to whether or not the appor-
tionment provision of the Act 9 applies to silicosis and
asbestosis. The Act is specific in stating (1) that compen-
sation shall not be payable for partial disability from either
disease and (2) that if total disability or both shall result
from "uncomplicated silicosis or asbestosis" certain bene-
fits shall be payable.9" However, there is no provision
stating that compensation shall not be paid for total dis-
ability or death from silicosis complicated by some other
"
5 Act, See. 32-C. See supra n. 44, and text thereto. Item 2, supra.
"6 See supra n. 84, and text thereto.
87 Act, Sec. 32-E. See supra notes 39 and 40 and text thereto.
11 Act, Sec. 32-C. This is only important in contra-distinction to the
provision governing other occupational diseases, in which event the em-
ployer during the "last Injurious exposure" will be held liable. Here for
silicosis and asbestosis the question of "last injurious exposure" is limited
by the provision that such exposure be "during a period of sixty (60) days
or more" after June 1. In other words, an employer is apparently not subject
to being held unless the employe works sixty days or more in an injurious
exposure.
8- Act, Sec. 32-B.
"0 Act, Sec. 32-D.
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non-compensable disability or disease. It is difficult to
determine what will guide the Courts in their interpreta-
tion of this provision. Since the Act states that "In the
event of total disability or death from uncomplicated sili-
cosis or asbestosis, compensation shall be payable . . .",
and since it further states in the paragraph following the
one from which the quotation was just taken, that "In case
of death from uncomplicated silicosis compensation shall
be payable . . .", it would seem that the legislative intent
is clear. The intent apparently is to compensate only for
total disability or death from uncomplicated silicosis or
asbestosis, and that intent should govern."
8. The Medical Board.
The Act provides for the creation, by gubernatorial ap-
pointment, of a Medical Board of three members. Two
shall be experienced in the "diagnosis, treatment and care
of industrial diseases", and one shall be an expert roent-
genologist. All are required to have practiced their re-
spective specialties for five years, and must be in "good
professional standing". Their names shall be chosen from
separate lists of not less than three persons (divided as
above into two nominees "experienced in occupational dis-
eases" and one in roentgenology) to be submitted to the
Governor independently by the Deans of Johns Hopkins and
the University of Maryland Medical Schools and the coun-
cil of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of Maryland.
The term of the members is to be six years, and the original
appointments are to be made so that a term will expire
11 'The cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain the
intention of the legislature as it is expressed in the words of the statute,
and for this purpose the whole act must be considered together." Mitchell
v. State, 115 Md. 360, 364, 80 A. 1020, 1024 (1911), citing State v. Archer,
73 Md. 44, 20 A. 172 (1890). See also Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189,
96 A. 287 (1915) ; and Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 96 A. 764 (1916). On
the other hand, as a practical matter it should be pointed out that death
or even total disability from uncomplicated silicosis or asbestosis is almost
impossible of medical proof, because the end result of both of these diseases
is apparently almost always a complication of the disease with tuberculosis.
Hence if the intent of the legislature is probed deeply enough, possibly the
apparent inconsistency of providing an ineffectual remedy might force
the Commission and even the courts to allow an apportioned award of
compensation In these cases.
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every two years. The Chairman is to be designated by the
Governor.2
Generally, the powers of the Medical Board involve the
right to formulate rules to govern their procedure, to in-
vestigate working conditions, to order and conduct autop-
sies, to have laboratory work carried out, and to conduct
hearings and render decisions on "medical questions"."
9. The Health Department.
Under the Act both the State and the Baltimore City
Departments of Health are given concurrent duties. The
Commission which studied occupational diseases in Mary-
land, and the legislature, recognized the truism that a
compensation act for occupational diseases is no real rem-
edy, and that control and prevention is the only long range
hope for the workmen who are exposed to these diseases.9"
Thus they provided that the Health Department shall carry
on a continuing study relative to the control and preven-
tion of occupational diseases, and shall formulate regulations
looking to that end, after public hearings, which shall have
the force of law. The regulations shall be enforced by the
Health Department. The results of the studies and in-
vestigations made shall be put into the form of proposed
legislative changes in, additions to or subtractions from the
current occupational disease law. And finally, the Health
Department shall be the recipient of all occupational dis-
ease reports from physicians who learn of their exist-
ence.
95
92 Act, See. 32-G. The Chairman is to receive a salary of $2,500.00 per
year, the other members $2,000.00. They "shall devote as much of their
time as may be required to perform the duties and carry out the functions
of the board . . .". Ibid.
03 Ibid. This appplication of powers will be discussed more fully under
Item 11-a, infra.
11 See, among hundreds of such publications, the published 1937 records
of the Occupational Disease Symposium of the Northwestern University
Medical School, and particularly the address in these records of Mr. B. C.
Heacock, President of the Caterpillar Tractor Company of Peoria, Illinois.
Compensation legislation for occupational diseases is not a remedy; control
through disease prevention is.
15 Act, Sec. 32-J.
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10. Definitions in the Act.
(a) Specific changes and new definitions.
The Act changes several of the existing definitions in
the Workmen's Compensation Act to include the new occu-
pational disease provisions. The definition of "accidental
injury" is thus amended to include "the occupational dis-
eases specified and enumerated in Section 32-A of this
Article"." "Occupational Disease" is defined to mean
"only the diseases enumerated and specified in Section
32-A".9 7 "Silicosis and asbestosis" are defined to mean
"the characteristic fibrotic condition of the lungs" caused
respectively by each dust.9 8  Finally, "disablement" is de-
fined as being "the event of an employee's becoming actu-
ally incapacitated, either partially or totally, because of
an occupational disease, from performing his work in the
last occupation in which exposed to the hazards of such
disease; and (the definition adds) 'disability' means the
state of being so incapacitated". 9
°Act, Sec. 65(6).
9 7Ibid., (13).
"Ibid., (14).
9"Ibid., (15). The Compensation Act does not define disability from acci-
dental injuries. See, on specific types of disability, Baltimore Publishing
Co. v. Hendricks, 156 Md. 74, 143 A. 654 (1928); Congoleum Nairn v.
Brown, 158 Md. 285, 148 A. 220, 67 A. L. R. 780 (1930) ; Baltimore Tube
Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 164 A. 161 (1933). The Congoleum Nairn case,
supra, has this to say with reference to disability: ". . . the claimant's
eighth (issue) was whether the injury to the right hand rendered him
totally incapacitated from performing 'such work as he was accustomed
and qualified to perform, at the time of the accident'. And on his first
prayer the jury were instructed that they might find the permanent total
disability referred to in the eighth issue if they found that previous to the
last accident the claimant was able to do the regular work assigned to him.
but after that accident 'was totally and permanently Incapacitated to do
said work or any other work that he was accustomed and qualified at the
time of the accident to perform'. The objection is that total disability in
the Compensation Act means incapacity to do further work of any kind,
not only of the kind he was accustomed and qualified to perform at the
time of the accident, as the issue and prayer assumed. And we think the
objection is well taken . . . in this particular case, the claimant, although
he may have been considered by the jury as able to perform the duties of
some occupation as testified, was, under the Instruction, to be compensated
as totally disabled if the work for which he was previously qualified was
of a higher grade or materially different in other respects. In the opinion
of this court that was not the purpose of the compensation statute". It
may be stated parenthetically that in view of the above language, of the
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(b) Some apparent anachronisms.
Under this part of this paper it perhaps will not be
amiss to point out a few apparent statutory errors, of per-
haps minor importance, but nevertheless of general inter-
est. Attention has already been called to the possible lack
of clarification of the intent of the legislature with refer-
ence to the compensation of silicosis or asbestosis compli-
cated by other disease or injury.1°°
Strangely enough, no provision is made for changing
the language of Section 14, which is the section in the Com-
pensation Act specifically requiring the payment of com-
language of the cases cited in that case, of the statements of the Court of
Appeals, and of various utterances of the United States Supreme Court, an
interesting question of constitutionality may arise in connection with this
definition of disability. Of course, "all presumption being in favor of the
validity of an act of the legislature" (E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Ind. Ace.
Comm., 184 Cal. 180, 193 Pac. 105, 110 (1920)), the Court might hold that
the legislative intent was simply to increase the amount of payments by
the device of defining disability differently for occupational diseases and
for accidental injuries. But the possible fallacy seems to the writer to be
that the legislature is not basing its rule upon facts, and, as quoted above,
possibly "that was not the purpose of the compensation statute". See the
detailed decision in New York Central R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 61 L. Ed.
667, 37 S. Ct. 247 (1917), and particularly the following excerpts, contain-
ing various reasons why the Supreme Court held the New York Act con-
stitutional. "(The Act) . . . graduates the compensation for disability
according to a prescribed scale based upon the loss of earning power, hav-
ing regard to the previous wage and the character of the disability . . ."
(Italics supplied). In the new Maryland definition of disability from occu-
pational diseases the loss of earning power is ignored. Regardless of earn-
ing power, disability is based upon an ability to perform the work in the
last employment in which injuriously exposed to a disabling occupational
disease. ". . . there is the loss of earning power; a loss of that which
stands to the employe as his capital in trade. . . . it is not unreasonable
for the state, while relieving the employer from responsibility for damages
• . . to require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and according to a
reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss of
earning power incurred . . ." Again, in Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash-
ington, 243 U. S. 219, 61 L. Ed. 685, 37 S. Ct. 260 (1917), the Supreme Court
pointed out that the state constitutionally "may regulate (by compensa-
tion statutes) the carrying on of industrial occupations that frequently and
inevitably produce personal loss of earning power among the men and
women employed . . .". The phrase "loss of earning power" runs through
all of the cases, and definitely seems to limit the authority of the legisla-
ture. There is at least a possibility that other measures of disability may
be held arbitrary and unreasonable, and hence contrary to the fourteenth
amendment. (This same provision is Section 37 of the New York law, and
apparently has not been contested on the grounds discussed above). Then
too, the fact that a different measure of disability applies in the Maryland
Act to accidental injuries may amount to discrimination between employers
and hence possibly the definition might be held bad for that reason.
100 See supra n. 91 and text thereto.
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pensation to injured employees. That section provides
that:
"Every employer subject to the provisions of this
article (i. e., engaged in extra hazardous employment
or having jointly with his employer elected the Act),
shall pay or provide as required herein compensation
according to the schedules of this Article for the dis-
ability or death of his employes resulting from an acci-
dental personal injury sustained by the employe ..
(Italics supplied).
This omission, probably one of oversight, will undoubt-
edly not affect the validity of the attempted coverage of
occupational diseases, because the legislative intent is so
definitely clear. 0 1 As a matter of fact, Section 32-A ex-
pressly provides that "compensation . ..shall be payable
for disability or death" arising from certain occupational
diseases, so the legislative intent will not be hard to find.
Another rather unimportant error to be found in the
Act as amended is that the definition of "extra-hazardous
employment" was not in any way revised, in Section 65
(1),102 to include Section 32-A. Again the Court will un-
doubtedly go to the intent of the legislature, as expressed
in Section 32-A, and include in the old definition the newly
enacted Section 32-A, which by its express terms makes
certain occupational disease exposures extra-hazardous.
11. Administrative Procedure Under the Act.
Because of the fact that the Occupational Disease Act
changes in a number of respects the administration of pro-
cedure relating to claims, it was thought that the whole
subject of procedure should be discussed separately under
the three headings which follow.
(a) Procedure before the Medical Board.
"The State Industrial Accident Commission shall
refer every claim for compensation for an occupa-
101 Ibid.
202 "65 (1) 'Extra-hazardous employment' means a work or occupation
described in Section 32 of this Article". This is the unamended language
of this definition. (Italics supplied.)
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tional disease to the Medical Board for investigation,
hearing and report, excepting . . . such cases wherein
there are no controversial medical issues. No award
shall be made in any such case until the Medical Board
shall have duly investigated and heard the case and
made its report and its decisions with respect to all
medical questions at issue. The date of disablement,
if in dispute, shall be deemed a medical question.103 ...
Disablement and disability shall be determined by the
Medical Board as herein provided 14 . . . The per-
centage of . . . contribution (of a compensable occu-
pational disease and a non-compensable disease or in-
firmity to disability or death) . . . to be determined
by the Medical Board 105 ... The Medical Board shall
-file with the State Industrial Accident Commission the
records of all proceedings ... before (it) ... to-
gether with its own report and findings upon all med-
ical questions involved in the claim. Included in such
record shall be the findings of the Medical Board, de-
termining the nature of the disease, the extent of in-
jury and the degree of disability sustained by the
claimant."'10
In the few undramatic sentences above the Maryland
Legislature has provided the groundwork for a separation,
on an administrative basis, of medical and legal questions.
The framers of the Act took as their example the acts of
other states which have provided for medical boards in
connection with their occupational disease legislation. 10 7
108 Act, Sec. 32-H.
1o, Act, Sec. 65 (15).
105 Act, Sec. 32-B.
10" Act, Sec. 32-I.
10' In six states there is provided a Medical Board, and as a practical
matter the findings of these Boards on disputed medical questions are
almost final. Certain conditions are set out under which findings on
medical facts may be reviewed by the Accident Commission, but these
occasions are few. The States are: Arkansas, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania. In fourteen other states with occupa-
tional disease coverage there Is no provision for a medical board, but
examinations may (and In Kentucky and Rhode Island must) be ordered
by the Commission, before special medical examiners, in ten of these states
(California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin). In the three other states
with occupational disease laws there Is a Medical Board created, but the
findings in these are only advisory: New York (the Board here being lim-
ited to dust diseases alone), North Carolina, West Virginia. The four
states with no provisions at all relative to medical boards are Connecticut,
Delaware, Nebraska and New Jersey.
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They went a step further in their assignment of duties to
the Medical Board than have many of the other states, and
yet they stopped short of the rule that the findings of fact
on medical questions shall not be subject to the review of
the Commission. This rule has been in effect for sometime
in Massachusetts and Michigan, and was very recently
enacted into the laws of Ohio and Pennsylvania. It also
falls short of the very recent statutes of Arkansas (a new-
comer into the Workmen's Compensation field), Idaho, and
Pennsylvania, in which states only a very limited review
of the findings of the Board is allowed.108 In Maryland the
findings of the Medical Board are subject to be reviewed
by the Commission, and this procedure will be discussed
later in this paper.10 9.
The routine of the Medical Board, as set forth in the
Act, consists chiefly in the making of examinations of
claimants, the conducting of autopsies, the taking of testi-
mony of witnesses offered by either party at regularly
called hearings, and the rendering of findings and conclu-
sions concerning all of the medical issues involved in dis-
puted claims.110 If the employe or employer request it,
the Board shall allow duly qualified physicians of their
own choice to participate in the physical examinations con-
ducted by the Board."' Failure of the employe (or the
dependents) to cooperate in allowing the Medical Board to
conduct its examination (or its autopsy) will result in the
suspension of all proceedings and the abrogation of any
compensation payments which otherwise would be due the
employe.112
When the Board reports its findings to the Commission
it shall furnish the Commission with a complete transcript
of its proceedings, including all testimony heard, both from
medical and lay witnesses. It shall further indicate in its
"I See supra n. 107.
'10 Item 11 (b), infra.
220 Act, Sees. 32-H, 32-1.
"'Act, See. 32-H.
'Is Ibid.
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findings what medical reports and x-rays were considered
by it. 11
The Board has the power to order autopsies whenever
it considers such necessary; this power is given concur-
rently to the Commission." 4  The Board (or the Commis-
sion) may designate the doctor to perform or attend such
autopsy, and all autopsies are required to be conducted
under the supervision of the public official authorized to
supervise such proceedings. 115
Finally, the Act is very definite in its insistence that
certain facts shall be deemed to be medical questions. As
quoted at the outset of this portion of the paper, the date of
disablement,1 6 the percentage of contribution between
compensable and non-compensable disability,1 7 the nature
of the disease, the extent of injury and the degree of dis-
ability sustained are stated to be medical questions." s
It is interesting to note that the Act makes no definite
provision for compelling the appearance of witnesses at
hearings before the Board. The Board is given no powers
to punish for contempt, and no instructions as to the
method to be used in conducting hearings, the admissibility
of evidence, and kindred questions. Broad powers are
simply given "to make rules regulating its procedure,...
to conduct hearings on medical questions, . . . 'and to per-
110 Act, Secs. 32-H, 32-I. Apparently the intent here is to have included
in the record sent to the Commission all medical data reviewed by the
board, whether or not the doctors making the report were examined or
cross-examined formally by the Board. Cf. Dembeck v. Shipbuilding Corp.,
166 Md. 21, 170 A. 158 (1934).
11, Act, Sec. 32-H. It is difficult to unaerstand the reason for the con-
current powers given the Board and the Commission in connection with
autopsies. The Act is so definite In all other respects as to the separation
of powers of the two agencies that there must be some reason for the
possible conflict here created.
... Act, Sec. 32-H.
I" And in connection with the finding of the date of disablement, the Act
specifies clearly In Sec. 32-H that if it cannot be fixed scientifically, the
Board "shall fix the most probable date, having regard to all the circum-
stances of the case". This is a legislative Instruction to be arbitrary if
necessary, and yet It is probably sound enough to withstand attacks on Its
constitutionality on the theory that the public good requires a decision
to be made. Such language in the statute only emphasizes the fact that
fixing the date of disablement Is a difficult task, and that the Medical
Board Is performing the functions of a jury and must carefully weigh all
disputed evidence.
117 Act, Sec. 32-B.
119 Act, Secs. 32-H, 32-I.
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form such other reasonable duties as the work of the
Board may require"."' It is possible that the rule-making
power thus granted will be sufficient to authorize them to
prescribe hearing procedure, including minor evidence
rules, the appearance of parties, and the formal rules for
conduct of hearings, but it is difficult to see how the power
can be so found in the Act. Certainly it cannot be held
that the power to subpoena witnesses is given. But be-
cause of the fact that the Occupational Disease Act is
simply an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation
Act, then a certain latitude in interpreting the extent of
the powers given the Board may be found in the language
of the Compensation Act that "this Article shall be so in-
terpreted and construed as to effectuate its general pur-
pose", the ordinary rule of strict construction of statutes
in derogation of the common law to the contrary notwith-
standing. 20
(b) Procedure before the Commission.
As already indicated, the Commission is given concur-
rent authority with the Medical Board to order autopsies.12'
But in addition to this, the Commission is given the power
of sitting as an appellate body and reviewing, on the motion
of an aggrieved party filed within thirty days of the deci-
sion of the Medical Board, the findings of that Board. 2 2 In
the first instance the Commission simply acts as the trans-
mittal agency, and sends to all parties certified copies of
the findings of the Board. In the event no protest arises
within thirty days from either party, the Commission then
hands down its award, based upon and conforming to the
findings of the Medical Board on medical questions. But
if there its a properly timed request for a review by either
party, then, in the second instance, the Commission reviews
the entire record and the proceedings before the Medical
Board, and upon that record and its review thereof it may
"' Act, Sec. 32-G.
120 Md. Code (1924) Art. 101, Sec. 63.
"" See supra n. 114 and text thereto.
... Act, Sec. 32-I.
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render its decision. This may be, apparently (although
it is not specifically so stated), an award reversing any or
all of the findings of the Medical Board, and awarding or
denying compensation accordingly. 1
23
The importance of this review allowed by the Commis-
sion may minimize to some extent the probable dispute as
to what are and are not medical issues. In the last analysis
the Commission decides all issues, medical and otherwise.
However, there is a procedural dispute still possible, be-
cause in the case of medical issues the Commission is lim-
ited to the record made before the Medical Board, while on
all other issues it may initiate, hear and re-hear testimony
of all parties. But as a practical matter, since its decision
on all facts is final, 24 there will be less necessity than might
otherwise have arisen to determine the difficult dividing
line between questions medical and non-medical.1 25
There is granted the Commission the customary power
of continuing jurisdiction over all cases, but in all occupa-
tional disease cases the period of limitations on reopening
a claim for a modification of or change in a final award
must be made within one year (rather than three as in the
case of accidental injuries) of a final award. 26
(c) Procedure on Appeal.
As in the case of accidental injuries, an appeal to the
common law courts of Maryland is allowed in the Act.2 7
However, in occupational disease cases, unlike accident
cases, no appeal is allowed on the facts, and the findings of
fact by the Commission are final. Such a provision is con-
stitutional.1 2  Thus an appeal in workmen's compensation
cases involving occupational diseases will cover only ques-
1a Ibid. Apparently the Commission upon review may not open up the
record for further testimony: ". . . and upon the record thus made . . .
(i. e. "the proceedings, findings and report of the Medical Board") shall
render its decision or award upon all issues referred to the Medical Board".
"' See item 11(c), post.
12 To be practical again, the Act has settled rather clearly the main con-
troversial questions that might arise over this particular issue, by designat-
ing the important medical questions as such.
"" Act, See. 54.
12Act, Sees. 32-I, 56.
"I Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaaf, 149 Md. 648. 132 A. 160 (1926);
Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929).
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tions of law. The proceedings and practice will probably
be very similar to those now prevailing in appeals from the
Federal Employees' Compensation Commission,129 although
of course the method of bringing the appeal will conform
to the present Maryland practice.'
PART IV
THE MARYLAND CASES
In this concluding part of this paper the attempt will be
briefly to analyze the important Maryland cases-and there
are only a few-which directly bear or throw light upon
the probable future rulings of the Court of Appeals. It is
clear that the best that can be ascertained from cases
already decided is a trend of thought which may be helpful
in plotting the future course of the Maryland law relating
to accidents and to occupational diseases. But there are a
few beacon lights that may be helpful in this regard.
Probably the most praised, the most criticized, and con-
sequently the most widely discussed case in the United
States on the subject of accidental injury is the case of
Victory Sparkler Co. v. Francks.13 As has already been
pointed out, that case was the first in Maryland to discuss
thoroughly the scope of the phrase "accidental personal
injury", and to define that phrase and the term "occupa-
tional disease". Prior to the Victory case, for almost
eleven years the bar of Maryland, and the lower courts,
were in apparent agreement as to the elements constituting
an accidental personal injury.
It is conceivable that such harmony might have con-
tinued indefinitely, except that a jury, in a common law
action, happened to award one Catherine R. Francks a ver-
dict of $22,500 for injuries she sustained allegedly because
of the negligence of her employer in not furnishing her a
safe place to work. At that point the Court of Appeals
12933 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1937) Sec. 921.
1 0 See generally Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 96 A. 764 (1916) ; Monu-
mental Printing Co. v. Edell, 16.3 Md. 551, 164 A. 171 (1933).
1 147 Md. 368, 128 A. 635, 44 A. L. R. 363 (1925).
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stepped in (at the request of the employer) and decided
in the first place that when an employer is properly insured
under the Compensation Act, no injury sustained in extra-
hazardous employment, and arising out of and in the course
of such employment, may be the -subject of common law
litigation, and in the second place that the phosphorus
poisoning sustained by Catherine Francks was, under the
circumstances of the case, compensable as an accidental
personal injury under the terms of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.
The immediate effect of this decision was to reduce the
amount recoverable by the said Mffiss Francks from $22,500
to a maximum of approximately $5,500. The long range
effect was to include in the category of accidental personal
injuries a group of injuries which, before this decision,
apparently had not been considered to be covered by the
Compensation Act. This group could be said to embrace
a class of injuries to be called neither "occupational dis-
eases", as the term is defined in the Victory case, nor
clearly definable "accidental injuries", in the dictionary
sense of the term. The cause of the phosphorous poisoning
was held in the Victory case to be the employer's
negligence; the "accidental injury" was held to be the com-
bination of circumstances beginning in the unexpected (so
far as the employe was concerned) negligence of the em-
ployer in allowing phosphorus vapor to escape to the place
where the employe worked and culminating in the necrosis
of the employe's jaw as the direct result of the entry of
phosphorus into the employe's system. The time and place
of entry of the phosphorus into the system were not re-
quired to be shown; nor was there required the showing of
any definite lesion through which the phosphorus entered
to cause the poisoning. "The infection is the accidental
injury . . .". The necrosis was not the result of an occu-
pational disease because its cause arose not necessarily out
of the employment, nor as a natural result of the employ-
ment, but originated in the negligence of the employer.
The accidental nature of the necrosis lay in the fact that
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the infection was not to be foreseen or expected by the em-
ploye, and the injury was accidental regardless of the time
of its inception or the specific (in point of time) period or
periods of the injection of the poison. This classification
covered an "unexpected" happening (the "unexpected" or
"by chance" going to the unconsciousness of danger on the
part of the injured employe) arising out of and in the
course of the employment, whether the happening or in-
jury be the result of entry of poison into the body "through
the medium of a pimple point, an unsound tooth, a scratch,
or a lesion, or of ingestion or in breathing".182 But the
limitation is that the introduction of such poison must be
unexpected and unforeseen-thus held the Court in the
Victory case-to be called accidental under the Compensa-
tion Act.
Negligence as a Basis for Recovery.
Thus it will be seen that of all the constituent elements
going into the Victory case, the point of greatest import-
ance was that the employer's negligence made the poison-
ing unexpected and unforeseen so far as the employee was
concerned, "that the phosphorus poisoning happened with-
out her design or expectation, and so her injury was acci-
dental". 83 The negligence of the employer really seems
122 Ibid.
"' This case has been followed to an extreme in North Carolina (Mc-
Neely v. Carolina Asbestos Co., 206 N. C. 568, 174 S. E. 509 (1934)). This
was a case of asbestosis contracted in an asbestos plant, yet on the author-
ity of the Victory case it was held that negligence of the employer made
the disease an accidental Injury rather than an occupational disease; Cf.
Ramsay v. Sullivan Mining Co., 51 Idaho 366, 6 Pac. (2d) 856 (1931) quot-
ing the definitions of occupational disease given in the Victory case, and
quoted herein in the text to footnote 61. It is interesting to note that In
1925, shortly prior to the Victory case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
specifically excluded an argument that negligence played any part in the
Workmen's Compensation scheme. "But in cases arising under the Work-
men's Compensation law the question of negligence is excluded ... ".
(Bramble v. Shields, 146 Md. 494, 506, 127 A. 44, 48 (1925)). But in that
case the question was not that of the definition of accidental injury, but
rather a question of the meaning of "naturally resulting therefrom" as
used in Section 65 (6) of the Compensation Act. Aside from the above, the
Victory case has been cited, favorably and unfavorably (but mostly favor-
ably), by the Courts of last resort of the following States: Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, C. C. A. 8th, Minnesota (and other
Federal jurisdictions In some of the States listed).
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to be the turning point of the decision, because that was
held to create the unexpected and unforeseen condition of
exposure to phosphorus poisoning (the "accident") which
ultimately caused the necrosis (the "injury").
This theory of negligence forming a basis for recovery
has been developed and limited in Maryland in several
later cases. The next important case in which there was a
strenuous argument made by the employee that an em-
ployer's negligence made a case compensable was Gunter
v. Sharp & Dohme.184  In that case, in which it was proved
that the employe had nephritis or Bright's Disease, the
Court held that he suffered from an occupational disease.
It specifically went over the facts in so holding, and pointed
out that there was absolutely no proof of negligence, and that
all the evidence pointed to the fact that the employe was
suffering from an occupational disease as defined in the
Victory case. The inference, however, was that had negli-
gence been proved the decision might have been different,
because if negligence had been shown then the disease
could not have been said to have arisen necessarily out of
this employment.
The next case in point is Cambridge Mfg. Co. v. John-
son.1  In that case the negligence argument was ruled
invalid by the Court, but again because the employe tried,
and failed, in the attempt to show negligence. The Court
did not specifically hold that the employe suffered from an
occupational disease. As a matter of fact he died from pul-
monary tuberculosis, but the inference from the opinion is
that fumes in a feed mill aggravated this disease. The
13 159 Md. 438, 151 A. 134 (1930).
1F 160 Md. 248, 153 A. 283 (1931). An Interesting point in connection
with the decision In the Johnson case is the following statement of the
Court of Appeals: ". . . but in every case (referring to other cases hold-
Ing that diseases aggravated by Injuries were compensable) the injury was
such as could be pointed to as having occurred at a definite time and
place". This language of course should not be studied out of its context,
yet it definitely ignores the Victory case wherein it was stated that "the
fundamentally accidental nature of the Injury . . . (cannot) be altered by
the consideration that the Infection was gradual throughout an indefinite
period . . .". As a matter of fact, except for the answer given by the
Court to the employe's claim of negligence (which obviously was based
upon the Victory decision) the Victory case is not once referred to even by
inference.
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Court pointed to what might easily be designated as the
contributory negligence of the employe in failing to use gas
masks provided by the employer, and in not opening the
windows provided, and its holding was based upon the fact
that no accidental injury was shown by the claimant. It
ruled against the claimant by paralleling the case with the
facts proved in the Gunter case. It may well be said that
in practical effect the Court ruled that the disease was
occupational and also that it was not the result of an
accident.
In chronological order, the case in which the question of
negligence was next argued was Sinsko v. Weiskittel.136
The employe worked for years in a "sand blast room" and
finally died, apparently from the effect of the sand on his
lungs. This too resulted in a ruling against the employe,
also on the ground that the pneumonoconiosis (possibly sili-
cosis) from which the worker was suffering was not acci-
dental in origin. The Court definitely stated that in the
Victory case the phosphorus poisoning involved therein
"was held not to have resulted from the occupation as a
necessary or usual consequence, but from the negligence of
the employer".
A departure in the application of the rule of negligence
occurred in the case of Geipe v. Collett.137 In that case the
negligence was not on the part of the employer, but was
charged to a third person, whose actions created an un-
foreseen and unexpected condition, resulting in a paralytic
stroke (held compensable). This case is perhaps not ex-
actly in line with the group here presented, but it certainly
should be included in this discussion. A truck driver was
following, in his truck, another vehicle, on the rear of
which a man was riding. This person so riding suddenly
jumped from the tail gate of the other vehicle. The truck
driver, Collett, was so surprised and shocked that he suf-
fered a paralytic stroke in attempting to avoid the man
who jumped. The important point brought out in this case
" 163 Md. 614, 163 A. 851 (1933).
187 172 Md. 165, 190 A. 836, 109 A. L. R. 887 (1937).
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is that the unforeseen and unexpected event constituting
the "accident" was the negligence, not of the employer,
but of the man who jumped.
Finally, negligence was spoken of and used as part of
the basis for a decision in favor of the employe in the case
of Foble v. Knefely.3 s That case was one in which an em-
ploye, by constant pressing of her knee against a "knee-
press" or lever, sustained a bruise of the knee tissues.
Here it was argued by the employer that the worker knew
of the defective knee press, and knew that it was stiff and
difficult to operate, and hence the negligence was not un-
foreseen and unexpected, but the Court pointed out that
even though the defect was known to the employe, the re-
sult, i. e., the knee injury, was not in fact foreseen by her.
Thus the unforeseen result, rather than cause, apparently
created the "accident". There was also an alternative
theory for recovery, namely, that there was a "series" of
accidental injuries through the constant rubbing of the em-
ploye's knee.
Diseases Aggravated, Precipitated or Caused by
an Accidental Injury.
The scope of this paper is not broad enough to cover all
the cases under this heading. It is necessary, however,
that several of the more important cases be briefly dis-
cussed.
It is a fundamental of Maryland case law that a disease
aggravated, precipitated or caused by an accidental injury
is compensable.3 9 Further, in almost all the cases reach-
1386 A. (2d) 48 (Md. 1939).
"I Jewel Tea Co. v. Weber, 132 Md. 178, 105 A. 476 (1918) ; Coastwise
Shipbldg. Co. v. Tolson, 132 Md. 203, 103 A. 478 (1918) ; Stewart & Co. v.
Howell, 136 Md. 423, 110 A. 899 (1920) ; Kelso v. Rice, 146 Md. 267, 126 A.
93 (1924); Bramble v. Shields, 146 Md. 494, 127 A. 44 (1923); Dickson
Construction Co. v. Beasley, 146 Md. 568, 126 A. 907 (1924) ; Standard Oil
Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925) ; Standard Gas Dquipment
Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644 (1927) ; Armour Fertilizer Co. v.
Thomas, 153 Md. 631, 139 A. 356 (1927) ; Kaufman Construction Co. v.
Griffith, 154 Md. 55, 139 A. 548 (1927) ; Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lilly,
154 Md. 239, 140 A. 215 (1928) ; Neeld Construction Co. v. Mason, 157 Md.
571, 146 A. 748 (1929) ; Townsend Grace Co. v. Ackerman, 158 Md. 34, 148
A. 122 (1930) ; Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. Brooks, 158 Md. 149, 148 A. 276
(1930) (compensation disallowed) ; Celanese Corporation v. Lease, 162 Md.
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ing this conclusion it has been held to be a jury question
as to whether or not an accidental injury has in fact caused,
aggravated or precipitated a disease.
In Slacum v. Jolley a sunstroke was held under the evi-
dence not to constitute an accidental injury, or to be the
result of one.140. To the same effect was Miskowiak v.
Bethlehem Steel Co. 41 On the other hand, in State Roads
Commission v. Reynolds,42 and in Schemmel v. Gatch,43
the facts were held sufficient to show an accidental injury
under the requirements laid down by the Court of Ap-
peals.144  These are best stated in the words of the Court
in Slacum v. Jolley, to the effect that sunstroke is compen-
sable, just as any other injury resulting from an accident,
when it is "caused by unusual and extraordinary condi-
tions in the employment which cannot be regarded as
naturally and ordinarily incident thereto"."
587, 160 A. 881 (1932) ; Waddell's Coal Co. v. Chisholm, 163 Md. 49, 161 A.
276 (1932) ; Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933) ;
Baber v. Knipp, 164 Md. 55, 163 A. 812 (1933); Baltimore Tube Co. v. Dove,
164 Md. 87, 164 A. 161 (1933) ; Federal Tin Co. v. Hoffman, 164 Md. 431,
165 A. 323 (1933) ; Catherman v. Ennis, 164 Md. 519, 165 A. 482 (1933) ;
Moller v. Unger, 166 Md. 198, 170 A. 777 (1934) ; Jackson v. Ferree, 173
Md. 400, 196 A. 107 (1938) (compensation disallowed); Spence v. Beth-
lehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938) ; all cases cited in footnotes
134-138 8upra; and all cases cited In footnotes 140-151, infra.140 153 Md. 343, 138 A. 244 (1927).
141 156 Md. 690, 145 A. 199 (1929).
142164 Md. 539, 165 A. 475 (1933).
142164 Md. 671, 166 A. 39 (1933).
14, Cf. Robertson v. North American Refractories, 169 Md. 187, 181 A. 223
(1935).
... In Schemmel v. Gatch, supra n. 143, the Court seems to go beyond the
boundaries limited in the Slacum, Miskowiak, and Reynolds cases, 8upra.
It held that the conditions under which the employe worked "were peculiar
to the employment and not such as affected the public generally in that
neighborhood", and from those facts (coupled with medical testimony con-
cerning the onset of the strokes), the jury might properly draw an inference
that the injury was caused by "unusual and extraordinary conditions in the
employment". The fact that the conditions were peculiar to the employ-
ment would seem to indicate that under the language quoted above from
the Slacum case the injury was definitely not compensable. See also for an
apparently extreme application of the rule later announced in Slacum v.
Jolley, Standard Gas Equipment Co. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 136 A. 644(1927). This case, never specifically overruled, held, among other things,
that a jury question was presented when an employe, in practically the last
stages of arteriosclerosis and chronic nephritis, slipped to the floor and
later died, having some burns on his body from the molten Iron he was
carrying, which apparently spilled on him after he slumped down. There
was apparently little or no evidence of "unusual and extraordinary condi-
tions In the employment". Note the strong dissent by Judge Parke, who
wrote the opinion In the Victory case.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
There is a group of Maryland cases which, at least after
the first one, held that carbon monoxide poisoning is defin-
itely an accidental injury. Bethlehem Steel. Co. v. Tray-
lor," " was the first case to hold this. The Court did so on
the direct authority of the Victory case, arguing that "a
succession or series of accidental injuries culminating in
the same consequential results" was compensable, and that
the evidence was sufficient for an inference of "successive
asphyxiations" from the gas, rendering the employe's sys-
tem "more sensitive to the one (asphyxiation) from which
he is said to have lost his life". In succession, and without
serious question on this point, followed the cases of Mount
Savage Mining Co. v. Baker, 47 and Red Star Motor Coach
Co. v. Chatham.148 Since carbon monoxide poisoning is
now compensable under the Act, these cases are hardly im-
portant in reference to that particular disease. However,
they bear very importantly on the question of what the
Court will consider an accidental injury, particularly when
diseases are contracted which are not scheduled in the Act,
or when they are contracted without meeting the require-
ments of Sections 32-A-D of the Act.149
Finally, following the Victory case there are three cases
holding that diseases or injuries of slow contraction are
compensable as accidental injuries. The first is the Traylor
case, supra. That is a definite example of a series of in-
tangible injuries not involving physical force. The inges-
tion of carbon monoxide gas into the system on repeated
occasions was held under the evidence to have so weakened
the constitution of the employe that he finally succumbed
to his exposure. Thus a field embracing all types of in-
ternal injuries from working conditions was laid open to
compensation, the sole requirement being that, as in this
case, there was a definite time at which the employe could
be said finally to succumb to the poison.150 The case of
14 158 Md. 116, 148 A. 246, 73 A. L. R. 479 (1930).
17 159 Md. 380, 150 A. 864 (1930).
1,8 163 Md. 412, 163 A. 886 (1933).
',o See Part III, Section 6, supra.
15 Cf. Spence v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 197 A. 302 (1938).
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Catherman v. Ennis 51 held that an employee who sus-
tained an abrasion through constant rubbing over a long
period of time could be entitled to compensation under the
Victory case and finally, in Foble v. Knefely, also previ-
ously discussed, the constant rubbing of a knee press was
held to be such an accidental injury as contemplated by the
Victory case, and therefore compensable.
PART V
CONCLUSION
In the above brief discussion of cases, the writer has
attempted to indicate some of the land mark cases in the
compensation field. A consideration of these cases does,
he believes, point at least to a few preliminary conclusions.
1. The case of Gunter v. Sharp & Dohme probably lays
down the limit beyond which the Court of Appeals
will not go in allowing compensation for diseases
not caused by accident in the ordinarily understood
sense of the word. It was there stated: ". . . an
employe who, while at work, suffers or becomes ill
from natural causes, cannot claim compensation un-
less such illness was brought on or accelerated by
some act or event accidental in nature".
2. The case of Schemmel v. Gatch showed the length
to which the Court would go in deciding when an
"act or event" is "accidental in nature", by allowing
compensation to an employe of a quarry who suf-
fered a sunstroke or some other form of heat prostta-
tion. It held that the condition of an unusually hot
day and a cloud from dynamite smoke or fumes over-
hanging the quarry were conditions "peculiar to the
employment and not such as affected the public gen-
erally"-although one of the reasons for the decision
in the Gunter case was that the disease was peculiar
to the employment and hence not compensable, and
181 164 Md. 519, 165 A. 482 (1933).
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the definition of occupational disease in the Victory
case was one having "its origin in the inherent
nature and mode of work of the profession or indus-
try", and also in spite of the holding in the Misko-
wiak case that heat prostration, on the authority of
Slacum v. Jolley, is not compensable as an accidental
injury unless caused by "some unusual and extraor-
dinary condition in (the) . . . employment, not
naturally and ordinarily incident thereto".
3. The Victory, Catherman, and Foble cases show the
limit of accidental injury coverage, under the Com-
pensation Act, and these cases indicate that the
Court will extend the Act to cover "occupational con-
ditions" which are neither strictly speaking occupa-
tional diseases nor accidental injuries in the common
acceptance of the term. And the rules of these three
cases are based at least in part upon the negligence
of the employer.
4. Finally, the Sinsko case shows the reliance the Court
of Appeals places upon the negligence argument of
the Victory case, the Court there holding that the
disease was occupational. In so holding it pointed
to the fact that the employe proved no negligence,
and the inference is clear that had he proved negli-
gence the Court would not have held the disease to
be occupational.
The final conclusions to be drawn from all of the Mary-
land cases, and also from the above analysis of the Act,
apparently are three in number. In the first place the
Court of Appeals will probably be guided by its own defini-
tion of occupational disease, particularly since it is in ap-
proximately the language used in limiting compensation
under the Occupational Disease Act, but also because the
apparent intent of the Act is so clearly to delimit the occu-
pational disease coverage to definite diseases contracted
under definite circumstances. In the second place it is rea-
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sonable to believe that the Court will continue to decide
each case on accidental injury as it arises, and may well
be expected to continue its trend of holding all injuries
compensable if there is any legitimate basis for so holding,
while remaining within the limits it has set for itself in de-
ciding these cases. Thirdly, there is ground for the belief
that the Court will stoutly maintain its distinction between
occupational disease and accidental injury, and will formu-
late even more clearly than in the past a third classification
of cases: those which involve diseases or disabilities
neither occupational nor accidental in origin, and hence not
compensable. This third classification would obviate the
economically unsound situation of the Compensation Act
becoming a health insurance statute, and would heed the
warning given by an Ohio judge-in a dissenting opinion,
by the waym-in a recent important case in which the Ohio
Court of Appeals abolished an apparently soundly estab-
lished and well settled precedent in Ohio case law:
"Paraphrasing the language of an eminent jurist in
a recent cause celebre, it may be well stated that if
experience is any guide the present decision will give
momentum to kindred litigation and reliance upon it
far beyond the scope of the special facts of this case, for
legal doctrines have, in an odd kind of way, the faculty
of self-generating extension". 152
The language of an Ohio dissenting opinion, however,
no matter how eloquently true (as the above quotation
undoubtedly is), does not strike as close to home as that of
an unanimous opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Therefore in closing this paper, the writer is grateful for
the opportunity of being able to quote the language of
Judge Digges, which appears in the case of Cambridge Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson,15 8 and which lends force to his conclusion
that the Court of Appeals will interpret the Occupational
Disease Act as its authors apparently intended it should-
152 Judge Matthias' dissenting opinion in the case of Triff, Adminx. v.
National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 135 0. S. 191, 20 N. E. (2d) 232
(1939).
253160 Md. 248, 153 A. 283 (1931).
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be: for the economic, social and moral benefit of employes
and employers.
"... the statute was designed to benefit both par-
ties: The employers, by making it impossible to have
exorbitant and unreasonable judgments obtained
against them; and the employees, by providing for
them definite and certain compensation for bona fide
injuries sustained during their employment, without
the danger of being defeated by the application of the
hard and fast rules of the common law. The cost to
the employer of the proper operation of such a system
is not onerous, if by the administration of the law its
subjects are confined to those provided in the statute
and in the manner therein provided. There is an un-
doubted tendency on the part of commissions and the
courts, due to the persistent application of injured per-
sons, to broaden the provisions of the law through ad-
ministrative or legal interpretations. This, it seems to
us, is a real danger to be guarded against, lest the eco-
nomic benefit sought to be accomplished by such enact-
ments be practically frustrated by employers being
driven to the necessity of employing only those who
are physically perfect, thereby excluding entirely com-
petent and efficient persons, who may have some slight
ailment or disease, from receiving any employment
at all. This was not the purpose of the Legislature;
and if an interpretation be given which is tantamount
to health insurance, it will become more and more dif-
ficult for employees who have passed middle age, or
who from one cause or another are not perfect physical
specimens, to obtain and keep employment".154
184 Grateful acknowledgment is made, for their generosity in reading the
manuscript, and for their helpful suggestions, to Messrs. Rignal W. Bald-
win, Jr., Thomas N. Bartlett, H. A. Idleman, Joseph A. Sullivan, Theodore
C. Waters, and C. E. Wilde.
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